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A Crash Course for Central Bankers
By Ben S. Bernanke
September/October 2000

A collapse in U.S. stock prices certainly would cause a lot of white knuckles on Wall Street. But what effect would it have on the broader U.S. economy? If Wall Street crashes, does Main Street follow? Not necessarily. Consider three famous episodes: the U.S. stock market crash of 1929, Japan’s crash of 1990-1991, and the U.S. crash of 1987.

The 1929 U.S. crash and the sharp decline in Japanese stock prices were both followed by decade-long economic slumps in each country. (The Japanese depression, despite much whistling in the dark by the country’s policymakers, still lingers.) By contrast, the macroeconomic fallout from the 1987 tumble on Wall Street was minimal. Why the difference?

A closer look reveals that the economic repercussions of a stock market crash depend less on the severity of the crash itself than on the response of economic policymakers, particularly central bankers. After the 1929 crash, the Federal Reserve mistakenly focused its policies on preserving the gold value of the dollar rather than on stabilizing the domestic economy. By raising interest rates to protect the dollar, policymakers contributed to soaring unemployment and severe price deflation. The U.S. central bank only compounded its mistake by failing to counter the collapse of the country’s banking system in the early 1930s; bank failures both intensified the monetary squeeze (since bank deposits were liquidated) and sparked a credit crunch that hurt consumers and small firms in particular. Without these policy blunders by the Federal Reserve, there is little reason to believe that the 1929 crash would have been followed by more than a moderate dip in U.S. economic activity.

The downturn following the collapse of Japan’s so-called bubble economy of the 1980s was not as severe as the Great Depression. However,...



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